In this paper, we describe a program of research on the topic of ridicule, which explored the differing effects of observing either ridicule directed at other people or selfdisparaging ridicule. I n three studies, participants listened to humor that either ridiculed another person, ridiculed the self (the person expressing the humor), or involved no ridicule. Results in two studies showed that observing ridicule that targeted another person led participants to conform more to the alleged attitudes of others and to behave in ways suggesting a heightened fear of failure, compared to self-ridicule or no ridicule. I n contrast, results in a third study showed that observing self-disparaging ridicule led participants to generate more creative ideas, compared to other-ridicule or no ridicule. The implications of these "inhibiting" effects of other-ridicule and "disinhibiting" effects of self-ridicule are discussed.
284). One theme of our ow n research, described later in this article, is that shadenfreude can be a double-edged sw ord, so to speak: w hen w e revel in the misery of others, w e may also become more acutely aw are that others may similarly rev el in our misery.
Disposition Theory
A more recent v ersion of superiority theory, disposition theory, echoes the basic premise that w e are entertained by the misfortunes of others, but also stipulates that our relationship to the target of the humor affects the degree of our enjoyment of the humor. Specifically, w e are more entertained by the disparagement of targets w e dislike or members of an out-group, as opposed to targets w e like or members of our in-group (e.g., La Fav e, 1972; Wicker, Baron, & Willis, 1980) . For example, in an early experiment on humor, Wolff, Smith, and Murray (1934) presented anti -Jew ish jokes to both Jew ish and non-Jew ish participants. Perhaps not surprisingly, they found that the non-Jew ish participants enjoyed the jokes more than the Jew ish participants. Zillmann and Cantor (1976) emphasized the importance of an indiv idual"s attitudes tow ard the target group, rather than merely in-group v s. out-group status, in determining one"s appreciation for humor that targets an out-group. For example, Thomas and Esses (2004) found that men w ho w ere high in hostile sexism reported more enjoyment of jokes that disparaged females compared to men w ho w ere low on this dimension.
As noted earlier, one w ay in w hich ridicule can be distinguished from disparagement humor is that the former is more personal in nature and is usually directed at an indiv idual rather than a group (Wilson, 1979) . For example, ridicule often consists of derisiv e joking about some aspect of an indiv idual"s behav ior or appearance. An interesting study that examined personal attitudes tow ard a particular indiv idual w as conducted by Zillmann and Bryant (1980) . I n this study, participants w ere treated either rudely or politely by a female experimenter. Participants then w itnessed her in one of three conditions: she spilled a cup of hot tea on herself; she spilled tea on herself w hen a jack-in-the-box suddenly popped out of a box; or a jack-in-the-box popped up, but she did not spill her tea. Results of the study indicated that humor cues (smiling and laughing) w ere highest in the condition in w hich the participants had been treated rudely by the experimenter and the tea w as spilled in response to the jack-in-the-box. I t appeared, therefore, that observ ing a disliked target hav e a Europe"s Journal of Psychology 50 mishap w as not sufficient for the experience of mirth: some humorous cues w ere also necessary.
Social I dentity Theory
Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986 ) is a broad perspectiv e built on the assumption that people"s group memberships constitute an important part of their identity. Whereas traditional models of identity focus on indiv iduals" personal qualities and accomplishments (Baumeister, 1998) , social identity theory emphasizes indiv iduals" social relationships and group memberships as additional sources of selfev aluation.
Social identity theory assumes that people w ant to maintain a positiv e identity, including a positiv e social identity. One w ay to achiev e a positiv e social identity is by judging one"s ow n groups to be superior to other groups. I n fact, researchers hav e found that indiv iduals w ill try to create a positiv e social identity by treating members of in-groups more fav orably than members of out-groups (e.g., Tajfel, 1970) .
Clearly, a motiv ation to perceiv e one"s in-groups as superior to out-groups can be serv ed by disparaging humor about those out-groups. Thus, social identity theory prov ides a motiv ational account of w hy people enjoy disparagement humor (Bourhis, R.Y., Nicholas, J.G., How ard, G., & Henri, T. 1977; Ferguson & Ford, 2008) . For example, ev idence that members of ethnic groups find humor about other ethnic groups funnier than humor about their own ethnic group (e.g., La Fav e, 1972; Wicker et al., 1980; Wolff et al., 1934) may reflect perceiv ers" desires to create or maintain a positiv e social identity.
The Effects of Disparagement Humor on Attitudes and behavior
Giv en the prev alence of disparagement humor in our culture, understanding its effects on listeners" attitudes and behav ior is important. There is a common perception that disparagement humor can influence listeners" stereotypes; that is, hearing disparaging jokes targeting a particular group may strengthen or perhaps ev en create negativ e stereotypes about that group. A series of experiments by Olson, Maio, and Hobden (1999) tested this perception. I n their studies, participants w ere exposed to disparaging humor about men or about law yers, w hereas control groups w ere exposed to non-disparaging humor, non-humorous disparagement, or nothing. Participants" attitudes tow ards the target groups w ere then assessed, as w ell as the latencies of responses to these attitude items (as an indication of the Contrasting Effects of Ridicule 51 accessibility, or ease of retriev al, of the attitudes). Additionally, participants w ere asked to rate the target groups on stereotypic attributes and to ev aluate ambiguous behav iors by members of the target group.
The results suggested that exposure to disparaging humor did not influence participants" attitudes tow ard members of the target group, nor did it elicit stereotypical attributions regarding the group. One important limitation of these studies, as the authors noted, w as that the targets of the disparagement humor w ere relativ ely high-status indiv iduals (law yers). Perhaps the effects of exposure to disparagement humor w ould be more pronounced w ith socially marginalized groups.
A subsequent experiment asked participants to recite, as opposed to listen to, disparaging humor about another target group (New foundlanders-people liv ing in a Canadian prov ince w ho are sometimes negativ ely stereotyped). Results show ed that participants w ho had recited the humor expressed more negativ e stereotypes about New foundlanders than did those w ho recited non-disparaging humor (Maio, Olson, & Bush, 1997) . The authors noted that these findings could be explained by either cognitiv e dissonance theory or self-perception theory. According to cognitiv e dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) , the participants" negativ e behav ior (reciting the disparaging jokes) may hav e conflicted w ith their actual, positiv e attitudes tow ard the target group, w hich elicited dissonance arousal and led them to alter their opinions to be more consistent w ith their negativ e behav ior. Alternativ ely, according to self-perception theory (Bem, 1967) , participants may hav e been unsure of their original attitudes tow ard the target group. Reciting disparaging jokes about that group may hav e led participants to infer that their attitudes w ere relativ ely negativ e.
Prejudiced Norm Theory
A relativ ely recent theory that has attempted to delineate more clearly the mechanisms through w hich disparagement humor can affect people"s attitudes is prejudiced norm theory (Ford & Ferguson, 2004) . These researchers hav e focused on w hether disparaging humor targeting an out-group increases tolerance for discrimination tow ard members of those groups. According to Ford and Ferguson, disparaging humor makes prejudice and discrimination tow ard the target group more acceptable; it contains a "normativ e standard that, in this context, one need not consider discrimination against the targeted group in a serious or critical manner" (p. 83). As a result, indiv iduals w ho are already predisposed to feel Europe"s Journal of Psychology 52 negativ ely tow ard the target group are likely to exhibit increased tolerance for discrimination. For example, Ford et al. (2001) found that men w ho scored high in hostile sexism w ere more likely than men low in this dimension to perceiv e a norm of tolerance to sexism upon exposure to sexist humor. Exposure to non-humorous sexist statements, or to non-sexist humor, did not produce this tolerance. I t appears that the lev ity contained in humor allow s those w ho are predisposed to feel negativ ely about particular groups to bypass critical assessment of the derogatory information embedded in the humor.
Ridicule as an Educational Corrective
Some researchers have also examined w hether ridicule may be used an educational correctiv e-to encourage positiv e behav iors through the ridicule of negativ e behav iors. For example, an experiment by Bryant, Brow n, Parks, and Zillmann (1983) had young children observ e muppet models being corrected for engaging in specific negativ e behav iors through either ridicule, commands, or suggestions. Later, the children w ere observ ed to see w hether they engaged in the targeted negativ e behav iors. I nterestingly, 6-year olds w ere more influenced by the ridicule than the other modes of correction, w hereas 4-year olds w ere not. The authors hypothesized that "6-year olds are apparently sufficiently socialized to recognize and appreciate the punishing pow er of derisiv e laughter. I n contrast, 4-year olds…may lack the experience necessary to recognize derision for w hat it is" (Bryant et al., 1983, p. 252) .
Another study examining the use of ridicule as an educational correctiv e w as conducted w ith univ ersity students (Bryant, Brow n, & Parks, 1981) . Students in a lecture-style course w ere giv en one of three course handouts employing different motiv ational strategies. I n one condition, the handout consisted of cartoons ridiculing students w ho did not complete their course readings. Other students w ere giv en handouts insulting (w ithout humor) students w ho did not complete the readings. A third group of students w as assigned to a "gentle reminder" condition, w ith a message stressing the importance of completing the course readings. The dependent measure in this study w as the performance of the students on a surprise quiz that tested know ledge of the course readings. Students in the ridicule condition performed significantly better on the quiz than did students in the other tw o conditions.
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An interesting aspect of these results is the finding that ridicule w as more effectiv e than insult in motiv ating the students. There are at least tw o possible reasons w hy, in v arious settings, ridicule may hav e more impact than insult. First, ridicule makes retaliation (e.g., rejection of the attempted influence in the course outline) less appropriate for the target. Unlike insult, w hich can only be interpreted as aggressiv e, ridicule contains an element of lev ity or amusement. Targets might hesitate to engage in retaliation to ridicule because they do not w ant to be seen as "a poor sport" or "hav ing no sense of humor." Second, ridicule is more socially acceptable than insult. A person (e.g., a professor) w ho ridicules others (e.g., in the course outline) may be perceiv ed as w itty and clev er, possessing a good sense of humor, w hereas someone w ho insults others is more likely to be perceiv ed as rude or boorish.
These perceptions are likely to increase the persuasiv eness and influence of the former indiv idual relativ e to the latter.
Self-Deprecating Humor
Self-deprecating humor occurs w hen an indiv idual pokes fun at him or herself.
Whereas humor that ridicules other people has been show n to hav e potentially negativ e effects (e.g., greater tolerance of discrimination against the targeted group), it seems plausible that self-deprecating humor might hav e different consequences. For example, observ ing another person making light of her or her personal shortcomings may induce liking for the apparently modest speaker, w hich might prev ent the attribution of negativ e characteristics to him or her. I ndeed, by joking about personal w eaknesses or failures, a self-deprecating model demonstrates a lack of concern about the social consequences of the admitted foibles. This lack of concern may encourage observ ers to perceiv e their ow n shortcomings as less serious or ev en amusing.
Unfortunately, research examining self-deprecating humor is relativ ely scarce and has not directly tested the preceding speculations. An early study conducted by Stocking and Zillmann (1976) found that a male w ho disparaged himself w as perceived by other men as hav ing low er self-esteem, being less intelligent, and being less confident than a male w ho disparaged others. Women, on the other hand, reported more fav ourable impressions of those males w ho engaged in selfridicule.
A more recent study by Lundy, Tam, and Cunningham (1998) For men, the attractiv e female target w as perceiv ed to be more desirable than the unattractiv e female target for most types of relationships, and humor had no effects.
For w omen, how ev er, there w as an interaction betw een attractiv eness and humor.
Self-deprecating humor increased the desirability of attractiv e males, but not of unattractiv e males. This increased desirability w as found for both short term (e.g., intercourse) and long-term (e.g., marriage) relationships. Unfortunately, because this study did not include targets w ho exhibited other-deprecating ridicule, it is impossible to ascertain w hether females" greater liking for attractiv e males w ho used self-deprecating humor w as due to the self-deprecating nature of the humor or to the simple fact that the males exhibited a sense of humor of any kind.
A study by Greengross and Miller (2008) , examining the adaptiv e functions of humor, did contrast the effects of self-and other-deprecating humor. Participants listened to tape recordings of opposite-sex people w ho generated either self-deprecating or other-deprecating humor, and w ho w ere described as either high or low status.
Participants w ere asked to rate the target"s attractiv eness as a short-and long-term mate. Humor style and status had no effect on short-term attractiv eness of the target, but both men and w ome n rated high-status presenters w ho engaged in selfdeprecating humor as being more attractiv e as long-term mates than those w ho engaged in other-deprecating humor, No differences w ere found in the low -status condition. These studies sugges t that indiv iduals w ho are socially adv antaged (e.g., high status, attractiv e) might be perceiv ed as more appealing w hen they engage in self-deprecating humor, perhaps because this type of humor signals a sense of modesty on the part of the humorist that w ould bode w ell for long-term relationships.
Humor Styles
Another issue that is relev ant to understanding both other-ridicule and selfdeprecating humor is the notion of preferred humor styles. The Humor Styles Questionnaire, dev eloped by Martin, Puhlik-Doris, Larsen, Gray, and Weir (2003) , w as designed to assess chronic indiv idual differences in preferred types of humor. The authors proposed that there are four principal types of humor: aggressiv e, affiliativ e, self-defeating, and self-enhancing. Martin et al. hypothesized that aggressiv e and Contrasting Effects of Ridicule 55 self-defeating humor are relativ ely unhealthy and maladaptiv e, w hereas affiliativ e and self-enhancing humor are more healthy and adaptiv e. Aggressiv e humor is the tendency to use humor to demean others; most ridicule directed at other people falls into this domain. Affiliativ e humor refers to the tendency to be humorous in order to amuse others. This type of humor represents a non-hostile, tolerant use of humor that enhances interpersonal relations. Whereas ridicule of others w ould generally fall into the category of aggressiv e humor, sometimes people in close relationships w ill lov ingly tease each other, poking fun at the other person"s w eaknesses. I n this case, the humor is intended more for affiliativ e purposes than aggressiv e ones. Thus, it may be difficult at times to distinguish betw een aggressiv e and affiliativ e styles of humor. A key distinction, how ev er, betw een the tw o styles is that affiliativ e humor is associated w ith concern and care about others, w hereas aggressiv e humor is characterized by "lack of personal regard or concern for the feelings and rights of others" (Kuiper, Grimshaw , Leite, & Kirsh, 2004, p.145 ).
Self-enhancing humor refers to humor that allow s the speaker to maintain a positiv e and amused perspectiv e on life"s trials and tribulations. Self-defeating humor, on the other hand, refers to the use of excessiv ely self-disparaging humor, perhaps to ingratiate oneself w ith others. The boundaries betw een self-enhancing and selfdefeating humor can be blurred as w ell. They are both self-focused in orientation, as opposed to the other-orientation of affiliativ e and aggressiv e humor (Kuiper et al., 2004) . Although the use of self-deprecating humor might be excessiv e in some cases (and therefore qualify as self-defeating humor), at other times, it is more moderate and constitutes self-enhancing humor-laughing at one"s ow n difficulties. For example, in the opening scene of An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore announces "Hello, my name is Al Gore, and I used to be the next president of the United States". The crow d ate it up. Although self-deprecating, this type of humor can be considered self-enhancing. Allport (1950) noted that "the neurotic w ho learns to laugh at himself may be on the w ay to self-management, perhaps to cure" (p. 180). When engaging in self-deprecation, w e take ourselv es less seriously, something that may be adaptiv e rather than self-defeating. At times self-deprecation may actually be liberating, allow ing us to reinterpret negativ e stereotypes in a positiv e w ay. I n his article exploring Jew ish self-deprecating humor, Dav ies noted that "ethnic jokes told from outside as mockery can become assertions of autonomy and v itality w hen told be the subjects themselv es" (1991, p.189).
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People may poke fun at others in gentle w ays that promote affiliation, or they can engage in more hostile other-ridicule. Similarly, people may mock themselv es in gentle w ays that remind the audience that ev eryone has w eaknesses and foibles, or they can exhibit more extreme self-ridicule, perhaps in a desperate attempt to be liked by others.
Armed w ith this brief rev iew of research on disparagement humor, w e can now turn to the specific issue that has driv en our ow n research. We hav e been interested in the effects of observing ridicule, either other-directed or self-directed, on indiv iduals" psychological states and behav ioral tendencies. Our specific hypotheses concern the possible differential effects of other-directed v ersus self-directed ridicule on conformity, fear of failure, and creativ ity. We coined the term "jeer pressure" to capture the essence of the process that results from observ ing other-directed ridicule.
Research on Jeer Pressure I n our research, w e hav e tested the hypothesis that observ ing another person being ridiculed has an inhibiting effect on the observ er. This jeer pressure (similar to "peer pressure") is assumed to spring from ev aluation apprehension-a concern on the part of the observ er that he or she might also become a target of ev aluation and ridicule. The ev aluation apprehension motiv ates conformity: the indiv idual w ill conform to norms and rules so as to av oid standing out. Jeer pressure w as also expected to reduce participants" creativ ity, w hich requires div ergent thinking. We hav e also tested a secondary hypothesis , w hich is that self-ridicule, rather than producing inhibition and conformity, might actually hav e a disinhibiting effect. We speculated that seeing an indiv idual make fun of him or herself might make the observ er less concerned than usual about being negativ ely ev aluated and, therefore, less conforming and more creativ e.
Overview of Dependent Measures in Studies
The dependent measures we employed in one or more of our three experiments w ere: conformity, fear of failure, and creativ ity. First, w e expected that seeing another person being ridiculed w ould produce conformity in the observ er, because he or she w ould w ant to reduce the likelihood of personally becoming a target of ridicule. I n fact, sev eral theorists hav e suggested that one of the social functions of ridicule is to castigate nonconformity (e.g., Martineau, 1972; Wilson, 1979) .
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Conformity w as assessed in Experiments 1 and 2 by hav ing participants rate the funniness of four cartoon strips, w hich had bogus ratings by "prev ious participants" included on the rating sheet (ostensibly to sav e trees by conserv ing paper). These "prev ious ratings" w ere designed to be erroneous: the funniest cartoons receiv ed the low est bogus ratings, w hereas the least funny cartoons receiv ed the highest bogus ratings. Conformity w as defined as adhering closely to the "prev ious ratings".
A second dependent measure in Experiments 1 and 2 w as fear of failure. We predicted that observ ing another person being ridiculed w ould increase participants" fear of failure on a subsequent task because they w ould be more anxious about being ridiculed if they failed. We assessed fear of failure v ia a ring toss task, in w hich participants tried to throw rings made of rope onto w ooden pegs.
According to early research conducted by Atkinson and Litw in (1960) , people w ho are afraid of failing on this task are more likely to employ either a self-handicapping strategy (w hereby they stand v ery far aw ay from the peg to toss the rings, giv ing themselv es a plausible explanation for failure) or a low risk strategy (w hereby they minimize the chances of failing by standing v ery near to the peg to toss the rings). I n contrast, indiv iduals w ho are low er in fear of failure are more likely to stand at a moderate distance from the peg to toss the rings; in this fashion, they are able to realistically challenge themselv es at the ring toss task.
Finally, in all three studies, w e measured creativ ity, w hich w e also expected to be influenced by observ ing the ridicule of others. Because creativ ity inv olv es div ergent thinking-thinking "outside the box"-it w as assumed that observ ing others being ridiculed might constrain this type of thinking. The desire to av oid looking foolish might interfere w ith one"s ability or motiv ation to engage in unconv entional thinking.
Thus, observ ers of other people being ridiculed w ere expected to exhibit less creativ e thinking than those w ho did not w itness such ridicule. I n contrast, observ ers of self-ridicule w ere expected to feel more comfortable taking risks and, therefore, to exhibit greater creativ ity. Creativ ity w as assessed in Experiments 1 and 2 using the Multiple Uses Task (Torrance, 1962) , in w hich participants are asked to generate as many non-traditional uses for a brick as possible. Responses are scored for both quantity and creativ ity (non-traditional responses). A different task w as used to measure creativ ity in Experiment 3, w hich w e w ill describe later.
Experiment 1 I n Experiment 1 (Janes & Olson, 2000 , Experiment 1), participants w ere exposed to one of three 8-min v ideotapes of a stand-up comedian telling jokes. I n the otherEurope"s Journal of Psychology 58 ridicule condition, the comedian told ridiculing jokes about another person. I n the self-ridicule condition, the comedian told the same jokes, but w ith himself as the target (e.g., "This guy I know tried to join a lonely hearts club, but they said "Hey, w e"re not that desperate"" v s. "I tried to join a lonely hearts club, but they said "Hey, w e"re not that desperate""). I n the control condition, the humor had no target (e.g., "He crossed a hyena w ith a parrot so it could tell him w hat it w as laughing about" ).
After observ ing one of the humorous v ideotapes, participants completed the fear of failure, conformity, and creativ ity tasks.
Results. Analyses show ed that participants w ho v iew ed the other-ridiculing v ideotape exhibited more fear of failure than participants in the other tw o conditions. Specifically, in the ring toss task, participants w ho v iew ed other-ridicule w ere more likely to stand either v ery close to the peg (indicating a lack of selfchallenge) or v ery far from the peg (indicating self-handicapping) than participants in the self-ridicule and control conditions, w ho did not differ and w ho stood a more moderate distance from the peg, indicating that they w ere realistically challenging themselv es (Atkinson & Litw in, 1960) .
Participants in the other-ridicule condition also exhibited more conformity than participants in the other tw o conditions. Specifically, participants w ho v iew ed otherridicule w ere more likely to match the bogus funniness ratings of the cartoons than w ere participants in the self-ridicule and control conditions, w ho did not differ.
No differences betw een conditions w ere found, how ev er, on the creativ ity task.
Thus, other-ridicule did not impair creativ ity. Surprisingly (at least to us), on all three dependent measures, no significant differences emerged betw een the self-ridicule condition and the control condition.
Thus, self-deprecating humor did not appear to hav e any disinhibiting effects on participants" behav ior or thinking.
Experiment 2
The second experiment (Janes & Olson, 2000 , Experiment 2) w as designed to replicate Experiment 1 and to inv estigate a possible mediator of the obtained effects of other-ridicule. Our conceptual reasoning w as that the effects of observ ing other people being ridiculed w ere caused by an increased salience of potential personal rejection; that is, observ ing another person being ridiculed increased the accessibility of the observ er"s thoughts about his or her ow n possible ridicule or Contrasting Effects of Ridicule 59 rejection. We assessed this hypothesized salience of rejection using a lexical decision task. Participants had to decide, as quickly and accurately as possible, w hether a string of letters displayed on a computer screen comprised a w ord or a non-w ord.
Forty trials inv olv ed real w ords: 10 acceptance-related w ords (e.g., accepted, approv al), 10 rejection-related w ords (e.g., humiliated, mocked), and 20 neutral w ords. There w ere also 40 non-w ord filler trials. If, indeed, observ ing other-ridicule increases the accessibility of rejection-related thoughts, then such participants should recognize rejection-related w ords more quickly (and perhaps acceptancerelated w ords more slow ly) than participants in other conditions. Experiment 2 employed the same basic design as Experiment 1. Participants v iew ed one of three 8-min v ideotapes and then completed the depende nt measures. New versions of the v ideotapes, how ev er, w ere dev eloped for this second study. These v ideos w ere ostensibly designed to be educational v ideos-teaching observ ers how to change a bicycle tire. On these v ideos, an instructor and his assistant gav e instructions regarding the lesson. I n the self-ridicule condition, the instructor made sev eral mistakes throughout the v ideo and expressed ridiculing comments about himself. I n the other-ridicule condition, the instructor again made mistakes, but his assistant directed the ridiculing comments at the instructor. Thus, the ridiculing comments w ere identical in the tw o conditions, but they w ere deliv ered either by the instructor or by the assistant. For example, at one point in the lesson, the instructor pinched his finger in a pump w hile trying to inflate one of the bicycle"s tires; he or the assistant then said "I guess that"s w hy they call it a foot pump!" I n the control condition, no ridiculing comments w ere made by either person in the v ideotape. The dependent v ariables included the same measures of fear of failure and creativ ity that w ere used in Experiment 1, as w ell as the lexical decision task. The conformity measure w as changed slightly: participants rated qualities of the v ideotape itself rather than funniness ratings of cartoons, but the logic of the measure w as the same (i.e., inaccurate ratings by alleged "prev ious participants" w ere prov ided).
Results. Replicating Experiment 1, the analyses show ed that participants in the otherridicule condition exhibited greater fear of failure on the ring-toss task and greater conformity in the cartoon-rating task than did participants in the other tw o conditions, w ho did not differ from one another. Thus, again, the self-ridicule condition did not hav e a disinhibiting effect compared to the control condition. Also replicating the first study, no differences betw een any of the three conditions w ere found on the creativ ity measure. I mportantly, the lexical decision task also yielded significant differences betw een conditions. As predicted, participants in the other-ridicule condition recognized rejection-related w ords (relativ e to neutral w ords) significantly more quickly than did participants in the self-ridicule and control conditions, w ho did not differ. Thus, exposure to other-ridicule made thoughts of rejection more accessible. No differences betw een conditions w ere rev ealed in responses to the acceptancerelated w ords. We also conducted mediation analyses that tested w hether thoughts about rejection mediated the effects of other-ridicule on fear of failure and conformity. These analyses indicated that the salience of rejection (as ev idenced by faster responses to rejection-related w ords than to neutral w ords) did, indeed, mediate the effect of other-ridicule on fear of failure; that is, w hen responses on the lexical decision task w ere controlled statistically, the other-ridicule condition did not differ from the remaining conditions in fear of failure. In contrast, the salience of rejection did not mediate the effect of other-ridicule on conformity. Perhaps our measure of conformity reflected a w ish not to stand out, rather than fear of rejection per se.
I n sum, the results of the first tw o experiments supported our primary hypothesis that observ ing other people being ridiculed w ould hav e an inhibiting effect on the observ er. I n both experiments, participants in the other-ridicule condition exhibited more fear of failure and more conformity than participants in the self-ridicule and control conditions. Additionally, ev idence in Experiment 2 implicated the accessibility of thoughts about rejection as the psychological mediator of the differences in fear of failure.
We think it is notew orthy that inhibiting effects w ere obtained in response to the v ideotapes used in these studies, giv en the non-threatening nature of these stimulus materials. Participants observ ed other-ridicule v ia a stand-up comedian or an educational tape demonstrating how to change a bicycle tire. There w as no possibility that participants w ould be ridiculed by these indiv iduals: the ridicule w as pre-recorded, and participants did not expect to meet the depicted indiv iduals. I f these kinds of distant, non-threatening exposures to other-ridicule can produce jeer pressure, imagine w hat people must feel in real-life situations w here they are exposed to actual ridicule and might, indeed, become a target of ridicule themselv es (e.g., in the schoolyard or at social gatherings).
Neither experiment found differences in creativ ity due to the humor stimuli. One possible explanation for these null results is that the Multiple Uses Task (Torrance, 1962) has been criticized for relying excessiv ely on v erbal fluency as opposed to Contrasting Effects of Ridicule 61 creativ ity. Additionally, in both studies the creativ ity measure w as assessed last, after the fear of failure and conformity measures. I t is possible that any effects had dissipated by the time the third dependent v ariable w as assessed. I n Experiment 3, w e employed a different measure of creativ ity, and creativ ity w as the sole v ariable w e assessed.
Also, neither experiment show ed significant effects for self-deprecating humor compared to the control groups. That is, self-ridicule did not hav e its predicted disinhibiting effects, such as increasing indiv iduals" creativ ity. One possible explanation for these null results may be that the ridiculing jokes contained on the v ideotapes w ere too hostile or extreme, so w hen they w ere told as self-ridicule, they fell into the self-defeating category rather than the self-enhancing category (Martin et al., 2003) . I n the next experiment, w e employed jokes that w ere gentler and more self-enhancing in nature, hoping that they might produce the predicted disinhibiting effect on observ ers.
Experiment 3
In a third experiment (Janes & Olson, 2009) , only creativ ity w as assessed. We focused on this v ariable because ridicule"s effects on fear of failure and conformity had already been replicated in the prev ious studies. We expected that other -ridiculing humor w ould hinder creativ ity in participants, giv en the "inhibiting" effect that this ridicule had on participants in term of conformity and fear of failure. Moreov er, some research suggests that env ironmental cues associated w ith danger activ ate in people a systematic, detail-oriented, risk-av erse processing style, w hereas a benign env ironment motiv ates a "risky processing style, in w hich internal know ledge structures serv e to enrich the information at hand, thereby leading to more unconstrained creativ e thinking and a broad conceptual scope" (Kuschel, Förster, & Denzler, 2010, p. 4) . I t seemed possible that observ ing ridicule of other people might be perceiv ed as danger-related, w hereas observing someone poking fun at themselv es w ould produce a more benign env ironment (and, therefore, unconstrained creativ e thinking).
I n this study, participants w ere again exposed to one of three v ideotapes containing either self-ridicule, other ridicule, or no humor. Participants w ere led to believ e that they w ere w atching an instructional v ideotape offering a 10-min lesson on w riting Haiku poetry (a highly stylized form of Japanese poetry) by a professor. As in the first tw o studies, the only difference betw een the conditions related to humor. I n the selfridicule condition, the professor poked fun at himself (e.g., "My idea of roughing it is getting poor serv ice at the Holiday I nn."), w hereas in the other-ridicule condition, the professor made fun of someone else (e.g., "His idea of roughing it is getting poor serv ice at the Holiday I nn."). These ridiculing jokes/comments w ere selected to be less caustic and denigrating than in the prior studies. I n the control condition, all humorous comments w ere omitted.
Participants w atched one of the three v ideos, ostensibly to learn how to w rite Haiku poetry, and w ere told that their comprehension of the material w ould be assessed.
After w atching the v ideotape, students reported their impressions of the instructor on a series of 7-point scales (e.g., "The instructor on the v ideotape seemed w arm and friendly"). Next, participants completed a creativ ity task, Torrance"s Test of Creativ e Thinking (1966), w hich inv olv ed using circles to make more elaborate objects. The v alidity of this test as a measure of creativ ity has been empirically supported (e.g., Torrance & Perbury, 1984; Torrance & Safter, 1989) ; scores reflect four dimensions of creativ ity: originality, fluency, flexibility, and elaboration.
Results. Analyses rev ealed a main effect for humor condition on participants" creativ ity scores. As predicted, participants in the self-deprecating condition exhibited significantly higher lev els of creativ ity on the task than did participants in the other-ridicule and no-ridicule conditions, w hich did not differ. Additionally, participants" perceptions of the instructor on the v ideotape w ere more positiv e in the self-ridicule condition than in the other tw o conditions, w hich again did not differ. Specifically, participants in the self-ridicule condition found the instructor to be significantly more "w arm" than did participants in the other tw o conditions and expressed significantly higher lev els of respect for the instructor than did participants in the other tw o conditions.
To our know ledge, this study prov ides the first empirical ev idence that selfdeprecating humor can hav e positiv e, disinhibiting effects relativ e to a control condition; participants in the self-ridicule condition w ere more creativ e than participants in the other tw o conditions. Creativ ity requires div ergent thinking-that is, approaching a task w ith an open and curious mind. I t makes sense that exposure to someone w ho pokes fun at his or her ow n w eaknesses and foibles can produce greater openness and creativ ity. Presumably, self-deprecating humor generated a non-threatening atmosphere that allow ed participants to be more "daring" in their thoughts about the task. There are at least three possible explanations for w hy the first tw o studies examining self-ridicule did not find any differences in creativ ity betw een conditions, w hereas Contrasting Effects of Ridicule 63 Experiment 3 did. First, the dependent measure for creativ ity in Experiment 3 (Torrance Test of Creativ ity) w as arguably a better measure than the one used in the first tw o studies (Multiple Uses Task), w hich has been criticized for tapping v erbal fluency rather than div ergent thinking. Second, in Experiment 3, the creativ ity task w as administered v ery soon after the v ideotape (w ith only the ratings of the instructor interv ening); this procedure ensured that the effects of observ ing the humor had not dissipated by the time the participants performed the creativ ity task.
Finally, the nature of the humor employed in the studies differed. I n the first tw o studies, the self-deprecating humor (and the other-ridiculing humor) w as quite caustic (e.g., "When I w as a kid, I w as so unpopular that my mother had to tie a pork chop around my neck just to get the dog to play w ith me"). I n the third experiment, the ridicule w as gentler and less dehumanizing (e.g., joking that someone"s idea of roughing it is getting poor serv ice at the Holiday I nn). I n this context, w e should note that the gentler nature of the ridicule in Experiment 3 might also hav e contributed to the null result that participants in the other-ridicule condition w ere not creativ ely inhibited (although reduced creativ ity w as also not obtained in t he first tw o experiments).
Another finding in Experiment 3 w as that perceptions of the instructor in the selfridicule condition w ere more positiv e than those in the other conditions. The selfdeprecating instructor w as perceived to be more "w arm" than the instructors in the other tw o conditions, and participants had more respect for the self-deprecating instructor. The latter effect-greater respect for the self-deprecating instructor than for the other-ridiculing instructor-conflicts w ith early research examining perceptions of the instigators of ridicule. For example, in the research cited earlier by Stocking and Zillmann (1976) , it w as found that a male w ho disparaged himself w as seen as hav ing low er self-esteem, being less intelligent, and being less confident than a male w ho disparaged others-though only by male perceiv ers, not female perceiv ers.
More recent research suggests that both men and w omen fav or opposite-sex indiv iduals w ho generate self-deprecating as opposed to other deprecating humor for long-term relationships, prov iding they are high status (Greengross & Miller, 2008) .
Perhaps changes ov er the last three decades in norms and sex-role stereotypes hav e resulted in more fav orable attitudes tow ard those w ho poke fun at themselv es and less fav orable attitudes tow ard those w ho ridicule other people among both men and w omen.
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General Discussion
Whereas much research has examined humor, v ery little has inv estigated the psychological and behav ioral effects of observ ing different types of humor. To our know ledge, w ith one exception (Stocking & Zillmann, 1976) , the present research is unique in that it contrasts other-deprecating and self-deprecating ridicule w hile holding the content of the jokes constant. This design makes it possible to ascertain that the target of ridicule, regardless of the content, is critical for how that ridicule affects observ ers.
Our research documents tw o, contrasting effects of ridicule. First, observ ing ridicule of others has inhibiting effects-it motiv ates people to be "w ary" in their behav ior.
The thought of being the target of ridicule oneself is av ersiv e enough to inhibit people from standing out (e.g., they conform to the perceiv ed opinions of others).
Although this fear of ridicule can be employed in socially useful w ays (e.g., the research described earlier on ridicule as an educational correctiv e), ridicule is often used for less socially desirable purposes. For example, school-aged children and teenagers are often subjected to ridicule for failing to conform to peers" standards of behav ior. The student w ho refuses to take drugs or drink alcohol may be ridiculed, as may an indiv idual w hose interests or clothes do not conform to those preferred by the peer group.
Of course, these last examples inv olv e the direct targets of ridicule, and our studies show that the effect of ridicule goes beyond the target. Our research show s that those w ho merely observe others being ridiculed are affected by it-ev en w hen they are in no danger of being the target of ridicule themselv es. Witnessing another person being ridiculed leads observ ers to av oid behav ior that might stand out; they choose, instead, to "play it safe". The fear of being noticed and/or performing badly in front of others can result in missed opportunities (e.g., participants in Experiments 1 and 2 did not realistically test themselv es on the ring-toss task).
Ridicule is not confined to the schoolyard by any means. Election campaigns seem to be increasingly characterized by ridicule and less by open discussion of the issues inv olv ed. An interesting, though unansw erable, question is how many competent and responsible indiv iduals hav e been deterred from seeking public office due to fear of personal ridicule. As Mark Tw ain noted, "There is no character, how soev er good and fine, but it can be destroyed by ridicule, how soev er poor and w itless" (1893).
The second effect of ridicule documented in our research inv olv es self-deprecating humor, w hich appears to hav e disinhibiting effects. With this type of humor, the indiv idual makes jokes about his or her ow n personal shortcomings. Often, selfdeprecating humor inv olv es poking fun at those "absurdities and infirmities" that beset all of us. Our final study show ed that merely observ ing self-deprecating humor can produce greater creativ ity-it seems to induce a readiness and/or ability to engage in more div ergent thinking, presumably because people are more w illing to risk generating ideas that might be perceiv ed as bizarre or outlandish.
Limitations
There are some potential limitations to our research on the effects of both self -and other-directed ridicule that should be noted. The first limitation relates to indiv idual differences. I t is likely that there are traits that influence how people are affected by v arious types of humor. For example, indiv iduals" chronic humor styles may influence their responses to observ ing ridicule. An indiv idual w ho tends to use hostile humor in interpersonal settings may be less influenced by observ ing ridicule of others than an indiv idual w ho refrains from that type of humor, w hereas an indiv idual w ho tends to use affiliativ e humor might be more disinhibited by self-ridicule than an indiv idual w ho refrains from that type of humor.
Additionally, the theme or topic of the humor may influence how people are affected by it. For example, observ ing other-directed ridicule that mocks characteristics that the observ er feels he or she also possesses may hav e greater impact than ridicule mocking a characteristic that the observ er considers personally irrelev ant. Thus, an athletically-challenged indiv idual may be more inhibited by observ ing other-directed ridicule that targets another person"s lack of athletic prow ess than w ould a v arsity athlete. The inhibiting effects of observ ing ridicule of others may be more potent w hen the observ er feels potentially v ulnerable as a target of the ridicule content.
Concluding Comment
The scientific study of humor is an important endeav or. Humor is one characteristic that distinguishes humankind from other species, and humor is ubiquitous in daily life.
Humans laugh from an early age and, moreov er, like to laugh. Humans do not, how ev er, like to be laughed at. These conflicting responses account for the complex effects of ridicule. We hope that our w ork w ill contribute to a fuller understanding of the behav ioral and psychological consequences of other-ridicule and self-ridicule.
